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Source selectionPublic–private partnerships (PPPs) play an important role in bringing private sector competition to public
monopolies in infrastructure development and service provision and in merging the resources of both
public and private sectors to better serve the public needs. However, in worldwide practices, there are
mixed results, substantial controversy, criticism and conﬂict over PPPs. This paper proposes a systematic
framework for the delivery of public works and services through PPPs in general. Justiﬁed by public
procurement principles, aimed at a public–private win–win solution, and based on worldwide best industrial
practices and lessons from unsuccessful projects, this framework integrates the four broadly divided stages
that repeat over time: (1) design of a workable concession, (2) competitive concessionaire selection, (3) ﬁ-
nancial regulation, and (4) periodic reconcession and rebidding. The four-stage framework takes into account
the requirements of public services, realignment of responsibility and reward among multiple participants in
PPPs, the monopolistic rights of the concessionaire, and the wide range of risks and uncertainties in the long
concession period. Varying competition elements are incorporated in each of the four stages for continuous
performance improvement in the delivery of public works and services. The design of the right concession
forms the base on which other stages are implemented in addition to planning the project and allocating
risks for enhanced efﬁciency. The ﬁnancial regulation allows the government to address changing conditions
and to regulate the concession for efﬁcient operation with due discretion, whereas the competitive conces-
sionaire selection and periodic reconcession and rebidding play critical roles in achieving innovation, efﬁcien-
cy and cost effectiveness through direct competition rather than government discretionary intervention.on of
ssocia© 2012 International Association of Trafﬁc and Safety Sciences. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd.
All rights reserved.1. Introduction
There is a huge demand on public infrastructure and services world-
wide whereas the government budget of any country is always limited.
In addition, the public sector often lacks the technologies, skills and ex-
pertise required for efﬁcient infrastructure development. Furthermore,
civil servants often have less incentive to invest wisely than private pro-
ject managers [1]. Facing these problems, governments worldwide are
exploring innovative means for improved infrastructure development,
and consequently different types of public–private partnerships
(PPPs) have been practiced. PPPs are contractual relationships
governing a long-term public sector acquisition and private sector pro-
vision of public works and services [2]. PPP projects have the followingTrafﬁc and Safety Sciences.
tion of Trafﬁc and Safety Sciencommon characteristics [3]: (1) a private partner provides the design,
construction, ﬁnancing and operation of the infrastructure, in return
for payments either from the users of the infrastructure or from the
public client itself; (2) public and private partners share risks and jointly
manage them through better utilization of resources and improved pro-
ject control; and (3) PPP projects are usually based on a long-term
contract to encourage innovations and low life cycle costs.
PPPs play an important role in bringing private sector competition to
publicmonopolies in infrastructure development and service provision,
and inmerging the resources of both public and private sectors to better
serve the public needs that otherwise would not be met. A great num-
ber of infrastructure projects have been successfully developed through
PPPs with signiﬁcantly increased value and substantial cost savings [4].
For example, it is reported that U.S. state and local governments have
routinely experienced 10–40% cost savings and improvements in ser-
vice quality and asset management through PPPs [5]. On the other
hand, many privatized projects suffered disastrous consequences be-
cause of construction cost/duration overruns, changing market de-
mand, depreciation of local currencies and/or reduction in tolls/tariffs
by utilities. Some of them had been postponed or abandoned by the
sponsors, and others had to be bailed out by host governments [6–8].ces. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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controversy, criticism and conﬂict exist over PPPs. The division in
thinking over PPPs is as wide as the world itself. Opponents argue
that (1) the proﬁt-making objective of the private sector motivates
them to seek cost savings at the expense of quality services, and there-
fore, is antithetical to the public's well-being; and (2) the involvement
of private sector in public services results in loss of jobs of public em-
ployees and consequently a counterproductive relationshipwith unions
of public employees [9]. In contrast, proponents contend that the proﬁt
motive of the private sector does not necessarily comprise service qual-
ity or reduce public jobs. Instead, improved level of service via cost ef-
fective solutions are possible as the private sector can become more
accountable to the public through well-designed PPPs, which provide
the public sector sufﬁcient control over the works and services being
provided by the private sector while allowing the management skills,
technologies and ﬁnancial resources of the private sector to come into
play. The National Council for Public–Private Partnerships (NCPPP) of
the United States provides successful PPP examples in transportation,
urban development, schools, water/wastewater and other infrastruc-
ture sectors to support these contentions [5].
The worldwide interest in PPPs, problems encountered in many
countries and the substantial controversy over PPPs call for an
improved methodology for improved infrastructure and service
delivery through PPPs. The writers have thus conducted research
corresponding to this call. This research results in a better under-
standing of PPPs and the development of a framework that inte-
grates different stages in the delivery of public works and services
and systematically addresses the key issues in each stage in order
to achieve continuous efﬁciency improvement. This framework isConcession or Free Competition
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Fig. 1. Four-stage systematic framework fobased on worldwide best industrial practices and lesions from un-
successful projects, aimed at public–private win–win outcomes,
and justiﬁed by public procurement principles. Details of the re-
search outputs are provided in the following sections.
2. Framework for a systematic approach
2.1. Four-stage systematic framework
A systematic approach is taken in the proposed framework for
infrastructure development through PPPs in general. Basically, the
proposed framework (please see Fig. 1) integrates four broadly divid-
ed stages in the infrastructure and service delivery process, including
(1) design of a workable concession, (2) competitive concessionaire
selection, (3) ﬁnancial regulation of the selected concessionaire
during the concession period, and (4) periodic reconcession and
rebidding to allow changes and adjustments of the concession, and
new entry for the concession. This general framework is proposed
on the realization that although there are many aspects that are
project, sector, and/or country-speciﬁc, the concept, process and key
principles in infrastructure and service delivery through PPPs are
essentially identical, which is supported by the World Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank [1].
A validation process had been conducted to justify the proposed
framework and evaluate its potential application in the industry. In
this regard, opinions of experts and practitioners in PPPs from Canada,
China and United Kingdom had been solicited. Sixteen professionals
participated in this validation process. In general, most of them agreed
that this framework was well-developed and that it included key issuesMultiple Objectives
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90 X. Zhang, S. Chen / IATSS Research 36 (2013) 88–97to be dealt with in a systematic approach to infrastructure development
through PPPs, although some suggested that some aspects of the frame-
work need to be modiﬁed or improved.
2.2. Public procurement principles
The acquisition of public works and services should follow relevant
procurement principles, mainly including accountability, transparency,
value for money and fair competition [10]. Accountability requires
clarity in assigning responsibilities to project participants and answer-
ability of the concessionaire to the government, regulator, and the gen-
eral public. Transparency necessitates an open approach to decision-
making, which enables the establishment of a mutual trust between
public and private sectors. In this regard, the government must make
explicit (1) its objective and requirements in a business transaction,
(2) key assumptions about risk deﬁnition, assessment and allocation,
(3) the format of the tender proposal and the deﬁnition of a
non-responsive proposal, (4) the tender evaluation criteria and their
relative importance, (5) contracting monitoring methods, (6) payment
methods, and (7) incentive schemes. Value for money requires that
costs associated with the acquisition of a public work and/or service
should be justiﬁed by the value generated from such a business transac-
tion. Measures should be taken to ensure that the proﬁt motive of the
private enterprise does not lead to an undermining of the public good.
2.3. Public–private win–win solution
Successful infrastructure development through PPPs necessitates
the adoption of a public–private win–win solution that adequately ad-
dresses the concerns of both sectors and guarantees the interests of
each of them. This win–win solution means that the PPP project agree-
ment should be designed in away that on the onehand it allows the pri-
vate partner to make adequate returns to its capital investments which
are usually sunk and subject to social, political, economic, technical and
environmental risks and that on the other hand it allows the public
partner to achieve social objectives, and productive and allocative efﬁ-
ciency, and to maintain appropriate quality, environmental, and health
standards. The requirement of a win–win solution is conﬁrmed by
Laffont and Tirole [11], who maintain that the regulator should design
a contract that is (a) acceptable to the regulated ﬁrm and (b) as good
as possible for society as a whole. This equivalently means that a con-
cession agreement should satisfy the “participation constraint” to pre-
vent the concessionaire from bankrupting and to provide it with
incentives to be efﬁcient [12].
2.4. Rationale of the framework
The public procurement principles and public–private win–win
solution act somewhat as guidelines or constraints for decisions
made in each of the four stages of the framework, which repeat
over time possibly as long as the service is needed. The four-stage
framework takes into account the requirements of public services, re-
alignment of responsibility and reward among multiple project par-
ticipants in PPPs, the monopolistic rights of the concessionaire, and
the wide range of risks and uncertainties in the long concession peri-
od. The design of the right concession forms the base on which other
stages are implemented in addition to planning the project and allo-
cating risks for enhanced efﬁciency. The ﬁnancial regulation allows
the government to address changing conditions and regulate the con-
cession for efﬁcient operation with due discretion, whereas the com-
petitive concessionaire selection and periodic reconcession and
rebidding play an important role in achieving innovation, efﬁciency
and cost effectiveness through direct competition which extracts mo-
nopoly rents without government discretionary intervention.
Varying competition elements are incorporated in each of the four
stages for continuous performance improvement in the delivery ofinfrastructure and services. In the concession design stage, risks are
effectively controlled through appropriate risk allocation and right
selection of a PPP model. In the concessionaire selection stage, the
most competent consortium available is chosen through competitive
bidding, which would offer cost-effective services at required quality
standards. During the concession, the ﬁnancial regulation maintains a
competition environment to address potential efﬁciency problems
related to the incumbent concessionaire's monopolistic rights and to
ensure its continuous efﬁciency improvement. By periodic reconcession
and rebidding at the end of each concession, a new entrant is allowed to
compete for the concession and this enhances competitive efﬁciency for
the following concession by choosing a new concessionaire that ismore
competent than the incumbent. Periodic rebidding also keeps the in-
cumbent concessionaire under pressure to improve performance dur-
ing the term of the current concession in order to raise its chances of
keeping the following concession, and to offer competitive service in
the following concession if selected.
3. Design of concession
3.1. Concession or not
Typically in a PPP project, the public client entrusts through a con-
cession a private entity (i.e., the concessionaire) with predeﬁned rights
(1) to implement a project, in which the concessionaire is responsible
for and has some freedom to choose the means for achieving the spec-
iﬁed performance targets related to construction of infrastructure facil-
ities, long-term operation and maintenance of these facilities, and
provision of relevant services; and (2) to collect fees for its services.
Concessions are maneuvered to achieve one or both of the two main
purposes: (1) bringing competition to government monopolies and
(2) attracting private funds, technology, knowledge and expertise. The
concession option should be evaluated against two other alternatives,
i.e., one that completely relinquishes government monopoly and
allowing direct competition in the market, and another that continues
government self-provision through a traditional public procurement
approach. If it is determined that the concession is the best option,
then the next step is to focus on designing an appropriate concession
that reﬂects the country and sector speciﬁc conditions and demon-
strates the best value. Several key issues need to bedealtwith in conces-
sion design, and these issues are discussed in detail in the following
sections of this part.
3.2. Separation of monopolistic sectors from competitive ones
A pure monopoly has the following characteristics: (1) a company
is a single provider of a product/service, (2) there are no close substi-
tutes to the product/service of this company, (3) this company con-
trols the total supply of the whole industry and is able to exert a
signiﬁcant degree of control over the price by changing the quantity
of supply, and (4) entry to the market is blocked by some economic,
technological and/or legal barriers [13]. A monopolistic company
has the power to limit production and raise the price above what
would be a competitive price and/or to use price discrimination to
maximize its proﬁts [14]. “Natural monopoly” refers to an industry
where the provision of a product/service involves huge capital costs
but minimal variable costs, and consequently, it is more economically
efﬁcient for a single company to provide this product/service than
free entry of many companies to compete for the provision of this
product/service [14,15].
PPP projects have been successfully developed in a wide range of
industries, including both competitive sectors and naturally monopo-
listic sectors. For a competitive industry, newcomers can enter the in-
dustry freely and there is no monopolistic power associated with a
PPP project in this industry. A PPP project is subject to competition
from other projects. For an industry that is naturally monopolistic,
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industry by allowing companies to compete for themarket periodically.
Concessions are most suitable for naturally monopolistic infrastructure
sectors. Therefore, there is a need to differentiate monopolistic indus-
tries from competitive ones. The “natural” reason for this industry to
be a monopoly is that it has large economies of scale: the average
production/service cost declines as the quantity of production or the
number of users increases due to more intensive utilization of
resources. Natural monopoly arises typically in network industries. It
is often wasteful to have more than one provider in a speciﬁc area be-
cause of the high costs of duplicating the infrastructure, e.g., parallel
railway systems or water/sewerage pipe networks. The World Bank
and the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank [1] list (1) the following sec-
tors as natural monopolies and therefore the most suitable candidates
for concessions: water distribution, power transmission and distribu-
tion, gas transmission and distribution, railway infrastructure, and
roads; and (2) the following sectors as potentially competitive and
therefore ordinary competition should be considered ﬁrst before using
concessions: power generation and supply, gas production and supply,
long-distance and mobile telecommunications and rail services.
Furthermore, an infrastructure sector may contain potentially com-
petitive and inherently monopolistic segments. Competitive seg-
ments (e.g., power generation and retail supply) may be separated
from monopolistic ones (e.g., power transmission and distribution).
In general, it is advisable that the government allow ordinary market
competition to play in the potentially competitive sectors/segments
and design competitive concessions for sectors/segments that are
naturally monopolistic. However, please note that concessions may
not necessarily be the wrong option for potentially competitive sec-
tors/segments. For example, if the industry is too small to support ef-
fective competition, a competitively awarded concession may be an
appropriate option. Nonetheless, before turning to a concession op-
tion, the ordinary market competition alternative should be exam-
ined to see whether it works or whether it can be made to work by
reforming and restructuring the industry.
3.3. Projections of market demand
PPP projects are often based on a project-ﬁnancing principle, that
is, debt and equity used to ﬁnance the project are supposed to be paid
back from revenues to be generated by the project, and lenders have
no recourse or only limited recourse to the general funds or assets of
the project sponsors [16]. The selection of a PPP project to be devel-
oped through project-ﬁnancing should be justiﬁed by a sound fore-
cast of the future market demand of the product/service from the
project. The project scope needs to be realistic and ﬂexible to reﬂect
the situations of future market demand, and different investment sce-
narios should be carefully planned for alternative market possibilities
so that they are adaptable to changes in the long concession period,
instead of ﬁxing the milestones of investments. Inappropriate project
selection, overly ambitious project scope/size, or rigid investment
plan may cause serious problems [17].
3.4. Risk allocation and government support
The allocation of risks among project participants is at the core of
the concession design. Public and private sectors have different capa-
bilities and may deploy different measures to mitigate different types
of risks. In general, risks should be allocated to the party who is best
positioned to manage them, for example, in terms of possession of in-
formation and accessibility to necessary risk hedging instruments.
The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank [1] have
summarized the main types of risks encountered in infrastructure
projects and the way in which they should normally be allocated,
not only between the government and the concessionaire, but also
between other parties, such as contractors, suppliers, insurers, andusers. The government should only transfer risks that can be better
managed by the private sector, and retains risks that are beyond the
control of the private parties. Furthermore, private sector investors
are usually risk averse. The government may even share some of the
risks that are supposed to be better managed by the private sector
to encourage more private parties to take part in the bidding process,
thereby enhancing competition and consequently increasing the
chance of obtaining the best offer. However, the government should
limit its contingent liabilities and ensure that the risk sharing mecha-
nism should not result in the concessionaire's weak incentives to take
measures to minimize risks or its adopting other types of uneconomic
behavior.
3.5. Evaluation of partnership models
A concession is deﬁned by the underlying contractual arrangement
of the particular PPP model adopted. There is a spectrum of contractual
models for PPPs with different scenarios of responsibility and risk allo-
cation among project participants. For example, the United States Gen-
eral Accounting Ofﬁce [18] has deﬁned the following models of PPPs:
build–own–operate, build–operate–transfer (BOT), buy–build–operate,
design–build–operate, and build–develop–operate. However, please
note that these PPP models are not always used consistently across
countries or evenwithin a country.Whatmattersmost are the risk allo-
cation and incentives built into a speciﬁc PPP scheme. Therefore, de-
signing a scheme that strikes the right balance between the interests
of the public and private sectors and that ﬁts the conditions of the in-
dustrial sector and the country concerned is pivotal [19].
In partnership evaluation, the government compares different PPP
models against its business missions and strategic needs, and conse-
quently chooses an appropriate one for the project under consideration.
In the United Kingdom, the following approaches are taken in partner-
ship evaluation: (1) determining the need within the public client's
strategic context, (2) formulating alternative PPP models, and identify-
ing, quantifying and valuing the costs, beneﬁts, risks and uncertainties
associated with each model, (3) checking each PPP model against the
public client's business needs, policy objectives and available resources,
(4) estimating the potential cost savings and/or service quality im-
provement of each PPP model, (5) examining the likelihood of success-
ful development of each model in light of the particular conditions of
the project, such as the operational needs, risk structure, the proposed
scope of risk transfer to the private sector, and the interest and capacity
of the private sector, and (6) presenting the results and recommenda-
tions to the management for ﬁnal decisions [20,21].
3.6. Comparison with traditional procurement approaches
The chosen PPP model may need to be compared with a public
sector comparator (PSC) to demonstrate value for money and enhance
the partnership evaluation. This is practiced in the United Kingdom. The
PSC describes a traditional public procurement option for the project
under consideration. However, the PSC does not necessarily mean the
government providing all assets and services directly, but assuming
some greater degree of involvement in project development. The key
issue of the PSC is to identify all the costs and beneﬁts to the public if
the project were to be provided by a traditional means of the full
range of services required under the chosen PPP model. In this regard,
one point that needs to be paid attention is that the PSC should include
the quantiﬁed costs of risks being retained by the government such as
construction cost overruns, and technological obsolescence in addition
to the capital expenditure, operation andmaintenance costs. Such com-
parison should be made over the whole contract life and reﬂect all the
constituents of the contract. Alternative benchmarks may be used as
the PSC for ﬁnancial comparisons with the PPP approach. This may be
a “do nothing” option, the costs and rates of return available in the
current market, a similar recent privately ﬁnanced project, or a quite
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model [22–24].3.7. Integrated project plan
Two approaches may be taken to integrate projects for improved
concession design and consequent better infrastructure development
and management. One is to package a new project or projects to an
existing project or projects. The Yan'an Donglu tunnel project in
Shanghai, China provides an example. The 30-year long BOT project
includes two tunnels, the Yan'an Donglu 1st Tunnel, which has been
in operation since 1988, and the Yan'an Donglu 2nd Tunnel, which
is a new tunnel. The concessionaire is a joint venture of the Chinese
state-owned Shanghai Huangpujiang Tunnel Company and Hong
Kong Jingli Company Ltd., with each company contributing 50% of
the total investment in the project. The investment of the former
was the asset value of the Yan'an Donglu 1st Tunnel while the latter
inputs in cash [25]. The other is to bundle nonproﬁtable and/or less
proﬁtable projects to proﬁtable projects so that proﬁtable projects
cross-subsidize less proﬁtable and/or nonproﬁtable ones. For example,
in Japan, a toll revenue pooling system is adopted, where tolls are set
at equal levels for the entire national expressway network regardless
of the costs or trafﬁc levels on the individual segment [26]. The private
sector usually lacks interest in developing a non or less proﬁtable
project on their own.Without bundling, they would call on the govern-
ment to provide part of the ﬁnance and/or charge prohibitive prices for
services provided by the project. In the former the governmentmay not
have money while in the latter strong public opposition may be
incurred by the unaffordable price.
The practices of packaging and bundling projects allow for expan-
sion and improvement of the network at a faster pace and produces
economies of scale, reduce transaction costs, diversify risks, and provide
ﬂexibility to the design of a concession. They enable projects that lack
self-ﬁnancing ability due to low levels of usage and/or high construction
costs to be developed without government ﬁnancial inputs. These
practices also increase the usage of infrastructure facilities due to
reduced prices. However, please note that cross-subsidies may be
distortionary and anticompetitive, and measures should be taken to
counter this negative effect.3.8. Competitive neutrality
Distortions often exist between private sector activities and those of
the public sector. The government needs to set out necessary policies or
legal measures to ensure competitive neutrality, that is, public and pri-
vate parties are treated objectively and uniformly in their competition
for public works and services. A competitively neutral procurement
process plays an important role in maintaining integrity of the procure-
ment process, sustaining competition, enhancing technical and ﬁnan-
cial innovations, improving resource allocation, increasing efﬁciency
and reducing costs [27].3.9. Performance-based contracting
Performance-based contracting (PBC) relates payments, bonuses
and penalties to performance levels of the concessionaire in the current
concession and even to future contract award decisions. It creates a
powerful incentive for the concessionaire to achieve excellence and
customer satisfaction [28]. For example, in the Argentine road conces-
sions, the serviceability index was used to measure performance [17],
and in highway concessions in the United Kingdom, payments are
linked to performancemeasures such as the availability of carriageways
and footways, road accidents, operational standards, bus journey time
reliability, junction delays, and queue lengths [29].3.10. Technical innovations
A PBC approach also encourages technical innovations by empha-
sizing “end results” instead of the process or means to achieve the
perceived end results. PBC requires that effective and efﬁcient project
development functions be designed and structured around the mis-
sion objective of the public client in order to maximize end outcomes.
The public client may provide a preliminary design as a reference for
the private sector to add innovations. However, the client should not
set out detailed design and technical speciﬁcations. Otherwise, it may
lose opportunities to explore the knowledge and expertise of the pri-
vate sector for a potentially improved design that may signiﬁcantly
reduce project life-cycle costs and increase efﬁciency. Furthermore,
the public client may require the private sector to design the project,
or initiate a design competition to solicit innovative designs. In either
case, a value engineering process may be conducted in the early de-
sign stage, where the government and the private sector participants
(e.g., designer, contractor and operator) meet to generate innovative
ideas to improve the constructability, operationability and maintain-
ability of the project.
3.11. Affordability
PPP projects often involve large amounts of construction costs and
long-term service delivery. The government needs to specify its af-
fordability threshold for a proposed PPP project. This affordability
threshold acts as a price target for the private sector bidders to devel-
op innovative solutions. A bid exceeding the government's affordabil-
ity will be dropped in the selection process [30]. The affordability
criterion works like a two-edged sword in maximizing the value of
the proposed project. On the part of the public client, it moves the at-
tention concerning consortium selection away from the lowest price
to other important issues, one of which is value for money. On the
part of the private sector consortium, criteria other than price are
used to endear the client, of which innovative solutions are the key
to surpass competitors and meet the affordability threshold [31].
3.12. Certainty versus ﬂexibility
Although the concession can be designed in detailed and strict
terms on the rights and responsibilities of both public and private sec-
tors, there is a need for a certain degree of discretion for the govern-
ment to address possible changes and new developments of the
project in the long concession period. Three main factors affect the
level of government discretion: (1) level of country risk, (2) reputa-
tion of the private parties involved in the project, and (3) characteris-
tics of the infrastructure sector and the particular condition in which
the project will operate. A high level of discretion is allowed when the
country has a stable political, social, legal and economic environment
for private investments, and the private parties involved have good
reputation. In a country without a sound legal system, a high level
of discretion may signiﬁcantly increase the private sector's perception
of risks and, consequently the increase in the cost of capital. The pri-
vate sector is usually concerned that the government's discretionary
power may be misused. To alleviate this concern, necessary recourses
may be provided to the private sector against the government's pos-
sible inappropriate discretionary decisions.
4. Best value concessionaire selection
4.1. Best value source selection and its challenges
The best value source selection (BVSS) is a multi-criterion evalua-
tion methodology that allows tradeoffs among cost and non-cost
criteria. The BVSS encourages creativity and innovation from interested
parties inmeeting the requirements of a public project and provides the
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value. However, the BVSS is open towide criticism bymany contracting
specialists from both the private and public sectors who think that the
process could be used with broad discretion to award public contracts
and is often subjective [32]. For example, strong challenges to the
BVSS have occurred from private sector participants, who (1) question
how the government has made its decision based on price and
non-price criteria, and whether it has conducted a thorough analysis
and fully documented the contract award decision, (2) doubt whether
they have received fair evaluation during a BVSS process, (3) question
what are, and argue against, the discriminators that led to their
nonselection, (4) allege that the increased value of the chosen proposal
does not merit its additional cost, and (5) criticize the government for
using the best value technique to ensure that the party of its choice re-
ceives the contract.
4.2. Best value source selection methodology
The courts have considered the challenges to the BVSS and the legal
decision has upheld the BVSS as long as the government documents its
rationale for the tradeoff between cost and non-cost criteria [32]. There-
fore, the public client should develop a sound BVSS methodology that
meets the requirement of the legal decision in order to withstand any
protest proceeding concerning a contract award in a BVSS. The essence
of a sound BVSS methodology lies in (1) the adoption of a competitive
source selection process that encourages innovative solutions, (2) the
establishment of a set of cost and non-cost evaluation criteria that
effectively “predict” the private sector participants' capability and
their potential contributions to the public client's best value objectives,
(3) the development of a sound evaluation method that ensures the
right “tradeoff” between these criteria such that a defensible contract
is awarded to the right private sector partner, whose proposal is per-
ceived to be able to maximize the outcome of the project under
consideration.
4.3. Competitive source selection process
A competitive environment should be maintained throughout the
BVSS process to motivate the private sector toward innovative and
cost-effective solutions, efﬁcient management of risks, and quality
service. A competitive process has the potential to signiﬁcantly in-
crease the outcomes of the acquisition. Governments should change
their mind setting and encourage private sector competition, for
which two measures may be taken. One measure is to invite the ex-
press of interest from a wide range of industrial sectors by publishing
a notice in newspapers and/or journals/magazines. For example, PPP
projects in the UK that are above a speciﬁed threshold project value
are required to advertise in the Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Com-
munity. The other measure is to compensate for an appropriate level
of the tendering costs of the private sector participants whose pro-
posals are not successful. In view of the large amount of tendering
costs, potential private sector participants may not be willing to
take part in the competition and as a result the chance of the public
client to get the best offer is reduced. However, while the compensa-
tion should be adequate to cover the substantial design effort of pri-
vate sector participants in preparing proposals, it should not be set
so high that parties will offer proposals merely to make a proﬁt on
the compensation. It is argued that a reimbursement at one-third of
the auditable design hours of the party making an offer will offset
the designers' actual costs without decreasing competition [31,33].
4.4. Transparent and valid evaluation criteria
The public client's best value objective should be translated into an
appropriate set of effective evaluation criteria that measure a private
sector party's capability and predict its potential level of contributionsto the public client's best value objective. The criteria should be unam-
biguous. This not only provides transparency in the selection process,
but also avoids unnecessary complications resulting from tradeoffs be-
tween offers on multiple criteria by competing bids [17]. The criteria
and their weighting should also be justiﬁed. Otherwise, the best value
objective of the public clientmay be impaired in addition to the possible
protests ﬁled by unsuccessful tenderers. Therefore, actual project data
need to be collected and correlated to the completed project value,
and sensitivity analysis needs to be conducted to determine the appro-
priate value of technical weighting and the cost weighting in order to
achieve the “real” best value through an equitable BVSS process [33].
Zhang [34] has developed a four-package evaluation criterion set for
PPP projects in general. The four packages are (1) ﬁnancial, (2) techni-
cal, (3) safety, health and environmental, and (4)managerial. Statistical
analyses of the responses from a structured questionnaire survey of in-
ternational experts on the relative weighting of the four packages and
the relative signiﬁcance of the criteria within each package have con-
cluded that the four-package criterion set may be used as a common
set of evaluation criteria for PPP projects in general, and be tailored
for a speciﬁc PPP project by making appropriate adjustments to reﬂect
the uniqueness of the project, such as the type and scope of the project,
the PPP model chosen, and the allocation of responsibilities and risks
among project participants.
4.5. Suitable evaluation methods
Anumber of tender evaluationmethods for PPP projects are current-
ly in use. These include the simple scoring method, net present value
(NPV) method, multi-attribute analysis, Kepner–Tregoe decision analy-
sis technique, two envelope method, NPV method+scoring method,
and binary method+NPV method. Zhang [35] provides a brief discus-
sion of these methods. The binary method, simple scoring method and
two-envelope method may be more appropriate for small and simple
projects. For projects in which technical issues are not a problem and
there exists proven construction technology, the NPV method may be
more suitable. For complex projects, the multi-attribute analysis and
the Kepner–Tregoe decision analysis technique may be more ﬁtting.
Furthermore, ﬁnancial aspects are the most important issue that
needs to be considered in concessionaire selection. Hence, the ﬁnancial
package is usually assigned amuch higherweight than other evaluation
packages, and the NPV method is often used in conjunction with other
evaluation methods to enhance the appraisal of ﬁnancial aspects.
5. Financial regulation
5.1. Objective of ﬁnancial regulation
In general, the objective of ﬁnancial regulation is to maximize the
incentive of the concessionaire to operate efﬁciently while respecting
the participation constraint (discussed in detail in a following sec-
tion) for continued provision of services in order to safeguard the in-
terests of both public and private sectors. This objective is achieved
through the following measures: (1) preventing the concessionaire
from abusing its monopoly rights associated with the concession to
realize supra normal proﬁts, (2) maintaining a fair competition envi-
ronment to ensure cost-effective and quality services, (3) sustaining a
relatively stable and public-affordable price regime, and (4) address-
ing either ex ante or ex post the changes in the concession period to
enable the concessionaire to achieve a “reasonable but not excessive”
level of proﬁts.
5.2. Types of ﬁnancial regulation
Financial regulation mechanisms may be broadly divided into
three categories: (1) rate of return, (2) price cap, and (3) intermedi-
ate scheme that lies in between (1) and (2) [36].
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Rate of return regulation is also called cost of service regulation in
that it essentially allows the concessionaire to pass through those
costs which are deemed necessary for the concessionaire to provide
the required services at the speciﬁed quality. A pure form of rate of re-
turn regulation protects the concessionaire against any ﬁnancial loss
and guarantees a predetermined rate of return to the investments of
the concessionaire in each period of the concession. The rate of return
is determined in part based on the cost of capital to the industry to
which the project belongs. These “necessary” costs are the base on
which to derive the required level of revenues, which in turn deter-
mines the prices to be charged for services provided by the concession-
aire. The price is regulated to ensure that the resultant revenues are just
sufﬁcient to cover the costs incurred. If the revenues are less than the re-
quired amount, the price will be increased and/or the excessive reve-
nues in previous years are used to compensate for the revenue
shortage in the current year, and to ensure adequate revenues for future
years. Conversely, revenues in excess of the required amount are
reverted to the public sector and/or prices are frozen or even reduced
for the following years [1]. Therefore, as the price is regulated up or
down, ﬂuctuations in demand and costs will not affect the concession-
aire's level of proﬁt.
5.2.2. Price cap
The price cap regulation limits the highest price the concession-
aire could possibly charge in each year of the concession for the ser-
vices it provides at the minimum required standards, usually taking
into consideration inﬂation (which is measured by the consumer
price index) and efﬁciency improvement in that year. The World
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank [1] provide the fol-
lowing mathematical deﬁnition of the price cap regulation:
Pt≤Pt−1 1þ It−Xt½  ð1Þ
where Pt = price in year t; It = inﬂation in year t; and Xt = efﬁciency
improvement in year t.
As shown in Eq. (1), it is important to set an appropriate level of
price for the ﬁrst year of the concession. This is usually done based
on the capital expenditure (actual or estimated), predicted values of
the key components of the operation and maintenance costs, the pre-
dicted average demand of services, the affordability of the users, the
length of the concession, and a reasonable level of return to the in-
vestments of the concessionaire.
Except for the price cap and the requirements on service standards,
the revenues of the concessionaire are unconstrained. The concession-
aire can keep the proﬁts resulting from reduced costs, improved efﬁ-
ciency and/or increased demand. Conversely, if these parameters go in
the opposite direction, the concessionaire assumes the consequent
losses no matter how severe these losses are. This is true even though
at the beginning of the concession the price are set to a level high
enough to cover the cost of service based on the estimates of key vari-
ables that affect the project's proﬁtability (e.g., costs, efﬁciency gains
and revenues) because the concessionaire is fully exposed to the vari-
ability between the estimate and the actual value of these variables [12].
5.2.3. Intermediate scheme
Both advantages and disadvantages exist in either the rate of re-
turn or the price cap regulation. In practice, usually an intermediate
regulatory scheme is adopted, which is a variant or hybrid of the
two extremes designed to achieve a balance between efﬁciency in-
centives and earnings insurance. For example, an intermediate
scheme may set the price at a level that enables the concessionaire
to recover an efﬁcient level of costs ex ante, but ex post the conces-
sionaire is given incentives to improve efﬁciency as the prices will
not be reviewed for a certain period. At the beginning of a following
price review period, the price is adjusted to reﬂect the efﬁciencyimprovement achieved in the previous period, but the beneﬁts of
the concessionaire made in the previous period are not clawed back
[12].
5.3. Price setting and adjustment mechanism
Central to a ﬁnancial regulation regime is the price setting and ad-
justment mechanism, as all regulations must have regard to the par-
ticipation constraint and implement it through price setting and
adjustment. A workable price setting and adjustment mechanism
should (1) establish clear rules on deﬁning the price structure of dif-
ferent categories of users, the concessionaire's freedom to vary the
price structure such as surcharging tariffs and interrupting services
to some types of users in times of high demand, and redistributing
proﬁts or losses between the concessionaire and the public client,
and (2) develop a sound methodology to assess the impacts of the
main factors that affect the cost structure/total costs, revenue struc-
ture/total revenues, efﬁciencies and proﬁtability of the project in
order to allow the concessionaire to achieve a “reasonable but not ex-
cessive” level of return. These factors include project costs (capital ex-
penditure, operation and maintenance costs, etc.), the reasonable
level of return to private investments, concession period, types of
users and their demand of services, efﬁciency improvement, and inte-
gration with the overall pricing system.
5.4. Balancing efﬁciency incentive and earning insurance
The concession arrangement is a principal–agent maximization
problem [37], in which the principal is the public client and the agent
is the concessionaire. In solving such a problem, various requirements
have to be met. In particular, there are two generic constraints that
should be satisﬁed: participation constraint and incentive compatibility
constraint [38]. A PPP model that satisﬁes the two constraints would
have a built-in mechanism, which ensures that the concessionaire ben-
eﬁts if it behaves in the public interest and suffers if it does not. The two
constraints are also the necessary requirements of a public–private
win–win principle.
The participation constraint requires that a PPP project provide
the concessionaire with a minimum level of compensatory return to
its capital investments, under which investors and lenders will with-
draw from the project and turn to other more proﬁtable opportunities
[39]. The participation constraint requires that in setting the level of
price the government needs to take into account the costs to be in-
curred by the concessionaire or by an efﬁcient benchmarked compa-
ny that provides the same service. The incentive compatibility
constraint requires that the concessionaire act in accordance with a
deﬁned solution in the interest of the public sector. For example,
this solution may require that the concessionaire continuously im-
prove efﬁciency and share the resultant beneﬁts with consumers.
Without the incentive compatibility constraint, the solution might
be economically meaningless for even though the solution could pro-
duce an optimal outcome, the concessionaire might choose not to act
in accord with it [38].
5.5. Further improvements in ﬁnancial regulation
The following points are useful in further improving ﬁnancial reg-
ulatory practices. First, the regulatory framework should provide the
right pressure and incentives for the concessionaire to continuously
improve efﬁciency, cost-effectiveness, and service quality. Second, a
balance should be achieved in granting essential discretion to the reg-
ulator and providing the concessionaire certain necessary recourses
against the decisions of the regulator. Third, the regulatory process
should be protected from both industry and short-term political pres-
sures. It is better to be conducted by a body that is politically and ﬁ-
nancially independent from the government or the concessionaire.
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lator and as a project party, and protects customers from abuse of
power by the monopolistic concessionaire. Fourth, the regulation
should be credible. Members of the regulatory body should be ac-
knowledged professionals, who would benchmark performance, set
price levels and ensure the rationalization of the existing system
and improve the system if necessary [1,17,26].
6. Reconcession and rebidding
6.1. Scheduled/unscheduled reconcession
Reconcession refers to the contractual arrangements to terminate
the original concession and design a new concession to reﬂect
changes and new needs. This may be classiﬁed into two categories:
(1) scheduled reconcession, corresponding to the case in which the
current concession ends at the scheduled termination date as deﬁned
in the concession agreement and (2) unscheduled reconcession,
which is deemed necessary to deal with signiﬁcant changes that hap-
pened before the expiration of the current concession, for example,
the concessionaire becomes bankrupt or fails to fulﬁll its obligations
that justiﬁes the government's termination of the concession, and a
force majeure risk makes it difﬁcult to implement the initial conces-
sion. The government usually reserves the right to terminate the con-
cession before its scheduled end, and it may terminate the concession
in terms of the general interest of the public even though the conces-
sionaire has fulﬁlled its contractual obligations.
6.2. Periodic rebidding of concession
Periodic rebidding allows new competitors to challenge the in-
cumbent concessionaire for the concession periodically. Theoretically,
there is no big difference between a rebidding and the initial bidding
of the concession. Rebidding usually focuses on the unamortized as-
sets of the current concessionaire, new construction, rehabilitation
and maintenance of existing and newly built facilities, and the prices
offered to consumers. Periodic rebidding is sometimes called a Chad-
wick–Demsetz auction, as Edwin Chadwick proposed this idea in
1859 and Harold Demsetz resurrected it in 1968 [19]. Generally, peri-
odic rebidding of concession is more economical than either free
entry or a long-lasting concession for an infrastructure sector that is
naturally monopolistic.
There are several speciﬁc reasons for periodic rebidding. First, the
initially chosen concessionaire may not still be the most competitive
at the end or even before the end of the current concession period
even though ﬁnancial regulation is implemented over the concession
period tomaintain the incumbent concessionaire's operational efﬁcien-
cy. This is partly because the exclusive rights of the concessionaire to
provide relevant services may lead to its lack of incentive to improve
efﬁciency, and technical advancements result in the obsolescence of
the technologies and the management practices of the incumbent con-
cessionaire. Second, periodic rebidding serves as ameans to reduce reg-
ulatory discretion of the government as it provides the government
with better information for price setting and adjustments. This may
also reduce the premiums required by the private sector on regulatory
risks [40]. Third, periodic rebidding forces the private companies to re-
duce costs and charge the lowest proﬁtable price for the services pro-
vided and maintains pressure on the concessionaire for continuous
quality service. Fourth, periodical rebidding facilitates contract adjust-
ments to signiﬁcant changes.
6.3. Valuation of the incumbent's unamortized capital
In addition to the initial construction costs, substantial capital in-
vestments may also be needed for rehabilitation of existing facilities
and possible new construction during the concession period. Thesecapital costs cannot be adequately predicted at the beginning of the
concession. The initial construction costs and the capital investments
made during the concession, particularly those made toward the end
of the concession, may not be fully amortized before the concession
expiration date. If the incumbent loses the concession in rebidding,
its unamortized assets should be reimbursed either by the govern-
ment or the new concessionaire. The unamortized assets include
both concession speciﬁc and non-speciﬁc assets. Concession speciﬁc
assets refer to those that are difﬁcult if not possible to be used for pur-
poses other than the concession such as underground water systems,
and assets that are not speciﬁc to the concession refers to those that
can be easily transferred/sold to be used for other purposes other
than the concession, for example, vehicles and equipment used to
maintain highways [40].
A sound asset valuation methodology including advanced measure-
ment instruments is needed to reasonably determine the value of the
unamortized assets and to factor them into the new concession before
putting it out for bidding [40]. Appropriate valuation and compensation
of unamortized assets provide incentives for the incumbent to make
proper capital investments for necessary new construction and rehabil-
itation, and to maintain infrastructure facilities timely, which would
lead to a low life cycle cost of services. This in essence ensures fair com-
petition and long-run viability of the periodic concession rebidding,
which aims to achieve continuous efﬁciency improvement.
6.4. Concession rebidding interval
For simplicity, the public client may set equal interval for the con-
cession to be rebid, for example, every ten years in power distribution
in Argentina. However, the concessions to be rebid do not have to be
of equal length. The suitable length of a concession depends on many
factors, including:
1. Capital expenditure and project revenues. Normally, for a ﬁxed level
of projected revenues, the higher the capital expenditure is expected
from the new entrant (e.g., related to new construction, major reha-
bilitation of existing facilities, and the unamortized assets of the in-
cumbent), the longer the concession should be. A short concession
is usually advisable if the new concessionaire is only required to be
responsible for routine operation and maintenance.
2. Bidding costs to the industry. The bidding cost as a percentage of
the total project development cost is different for different types
of projects. To save costs to the industry as a whole, the frequency
of concession rebidding needs to be reduced if it is perceived that
high bidding costs will be involved, and vice versa.
3. The level of complexity in transferring concession from the incum-
bent concessionaire to the new winner. A varying number of issues
need to be addressed in the transfer of concession, depending on
the features of the speciﬁc industry and the concession model of
the particular project. High transaction costsmay be incurred if com-
plicated issues are involved, for example, the settlement of the pos-
sibly large number of employees of the incumbent concessionaire.
In addition, the concession transfer may interrupt services to the
public. Therefore, more frequent concession rebidding may be prac-
ticed if the transfer process is not complex, and vice versa.
6.5. Biased rebidding favoring the incumbent
Recognizing that it may lose the concession in the upcoming
rebidding, the incumbent concessionaire tends to skimp on capital in-
vestment and maintenance of assets whose quality is hard to measure,
especially toward the endof the concession. In addition, any investment
or improvement by the incumbent in the concession's assets (including
both human capital and physical assets)would beneﬁt the newwinner,
further reducing the incumbent's interest in investing and maintaining
the assets. For example, the incumbent may have a weak incentive in
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mally required to hire the employees of the incumbent. Klein [40] ar-
gues that a biased rebidding in favor of the incumbent is generally
advisable to dealwith the incentive of the incumbent tomakenecessary
investments timely. This approach gives the incumbent a greater
chance to keep the concession as the concession is awarded to a com-
petitor only if its bid beats the incumbent's by more than a speciﬁed
margin. Such biased biddings have been used for traditional contracts
for equipment and civil works in the United States. However, this mar-
gin should not be too large so that the competitive efﬁciency is lost.7. Conclusions
PPPs play an important role in bringing private sector competition to
public infrastructure monopolies and in merging the resources of both
public and private sectors to better serve the needs of the public that
otherwise would not be met. The worldwide interest in PPPs, problems
encountered in many countries and the substantial controversy over
PPPs call for an improved methodology for improved infrastructure
and service delivery through PPPs. This paper proposes a systematic
framework for infrastructure development through PPPs in general,
on the realization that although there aremany aspects that are project,
sector, and/or country-speciﬁc, the concept, process and key principles
in infrastructure and service delivery through PPPs are essentially iden-
tical. This framework integrates four broadly divided stages in the infra-
structure and service delivery process, including (1) design of a
workable concession, (2) competitive concessionaire selection, (3) ﬁ-
nancial regulation of the selected concessionaire during the concession
period, and (4) periodic concession rebidding to allownewentry for the
concession.
The public procurement principles and public–private win–win
solution act somewhat as guidelines or constraints for decisions
made in each of the four stages of the framework, which repeat
over time possibly as long as the service is needed. The four-stage
framework takes into account the requirements of public services, re-
alignment of responsibility and reward among multiple participants
in PPPs, the monopolistic rights of the concessionaire, and the wide
range of risks and uncertainties in the long concession period. The de-
sign of the right concession forms the base on which other stages are
implemented in addition to planning the project and allocating risks
for enhanced efﬁciency. The ﬁnancial regulation allows the govern-
ment to address changing conditions and regulate the concession
for efﬁcient operation with due discretion, whereas the competitive
concessionaire selection and periodic reconcession and rebidding
play an important role in achieving innovation, efﬁciency and cost ef-
fectiveness through direct competition.
Varying competition elements are incorporated in each of the four
stages for continuous performance improvement of the concessionaire
in the delivery of infrastructure and services. In the concession design
stage, risks are effectively controlled through appropriate risk allocation
and right selection of a PPPmodel. In the concessionaire selection stage,
the most competent consortium available is chosen through competi-
tive bidding, which also forces the chosen concessionaire to offer
cost-effective services at required quality standards. During the conces-
sion, the ﬁnancial regulation maintains a competition environment to
address potential efﬁciency problems related to the incumbent conces-
sionaire's monopolistic rights and to ensure its continuous efﬁciency
improvement. By periodic rebidding at the end of each concession, a
new entrant is allowed to compete for the concession and this enhances
competitive efﬁciency for the following concession by choosing a new
concessionaire that is more competent than the incumbent. Periodic
rebidding also keeps an incumbent concessionaire under pressure to
improve performance during the term of the current concession in
order to raise its chances of keeping the following concession, and to
offer competitive service in the following concession if selected.Acknowledgment
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